








Commodifying the ‘Information Age’: Intellectual 






This article examines the role of the state and the rule of law in relation to the 
problem of intellectual property on the Internet. It concludes that the claim that states 
are no longer effective actors (and hence subjecting to them to political pressure is a 
waste of time) has conveniently omitted the state’s role as guarantor of the legislative 
infrastructure that underlies market activity. The state is critically required to legally 
support the markets of the ‘new economy’, and while its means of market intervention 
may have changed, this is not the same as withdrawal. The history of intellectual 
property has been a political battle to balance the rights of owners with the very 
important social benefits that flow from social availability of information and 
knowledge. Thus, states remain a key site for political mobilisation as regards the 
central legal structures of the (so-called) information society. 
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‘It is often forgotten that law as a matter of fact is frozen politics’.
1 
 
The compression of space and time which globalisation has heralded is often 
presumed to presage the transformation of the global political economy and the 
decline of the state as an effective political actor. Information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) are seen as one of the key catalysts of these changes. However, 
while many states may have reconfigured their legal institutions and modified their 
regulatory apparatus, these shifts do not represent a significant change in the role of 
the capitalist state. The frequent reification of the (global) market often underpins the 
argument that there has been a significant decline in the efficacy of the state, or the 
claim that we have entered some new phase of global economic organisation. 
However, markets need extensive political and legal foundations: where these 
foundations are absent ‘normal’ capitalism does not thrive; rather it is replaced by 
klepto-capitalism and economic collapse (as in Russia in the early 1990s).
2
 Often in 
the accounts of the new ‘information age’, the market is depicted as a natural 
phenomena, separate from the political economic functions of the state. This 
reification can obscure the underlying supports on which information age capitalism 




Although, not the central subject of this article, it is as well to briefly suggest the 
outline of markets in information and knowledge. Capitalism requires the 
commodification of goods into properties that can be bought and sold, to allow the 
exchange of goods within a developed division of labour. This needs both alienability 
(the ability to transfer legal ownership rights), and developed contract law to ensure 
such transfers are defensible. This underpins a ‘credible commitment’ to fulfil the 
obligations of transfer: the transfer of property rights in exchange for an agreed 
payment. This transfer requires the relinquishment of some (although not necessarily 
all) rights over the commodity by the seller in favour of the purchaser. For 
information and knowledge, this represents a clear difference from the ‘free’ 
circulation, and non-rivalry of non-commodified information and/or knowledge 
transfer. However, without the construction of scarcity no price could be guaranteed 
for transfer (as use could easily be obtained without purchase) and hence the market 
would struggle to function.
4
 
Since 1995 intellectual property rights (IPRs) have been subject to the TRIPs 
agreement which is overseen by the World Trade Organisation (WTO). While this 
agreement does not determine national legislation, for members of the WTO to be 
TRIPs-compliant their domestic intellectual property law must support the protections 
and rights that are laid out in TRIPs’ 73 articles. The agreement covers not only 
general provisions and basic principles, but also represents an undertaking to uphold 
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certain standards of protection for IPRs and to provide legal mechanisms for their 
enforcement. The robust dispute settlement mechanism which is a central aspect of 
the WTO now encompasses international disputes about IPRs. Prior to 1995, while 
there were long standing multilateral treaties in place regarding the international 
recognition and protection of IPRs (the Paris and Berne conventions), overseen by the 
World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), these were widely regarded by 
governments in IPR-exporting countries as toothless in the face of ‘piracy’ and 
facilitated the frequent disregard for the protection of IPRs in less developed 
countries.  
The inclusion of the TRIPs (and the General Agreement on Trade in Services) into the 
Uruguay Round final settlement was the culmination of a general strategy on behalf of 
the US and EU to force developing countries to adopt multilateral agreements in 
sectors which they had hitherto resisted.
5
 By withdrawing from their previous 
commitments under GATT 1947 and therefore terminating any obligations therein, 
the US and EU forced developing countries to accede to a much wider agreement 
under the WTO if they wished to retain the trade arrangements with which they had 
started the Uruguay Round.  
In addition to the advantages to be gained by having a tougher multilateral 
enforcement mechanism, the US government (alongside allies in the EU) wanted to 
move the international regulation of IPRs into the new WTO (from the WIPO) 
because their negotiators felt that they were more likely to gain agreements to their 
advantage by linking these issues to the international trade regime.
6
 The fact the 
WIPO was an agency of the United Nations, and therefore (however imperfectly) 
subject to some pressure from development orientated interests, further encouraged 
the move to the WTO, a separate membership organisation where free trade is the 
overriding policy concern.
7
 It is therefore unsurprising that the TRIPs agreement 
represents a particular ‘trade-related’ view of the role of IPRs in economic relations. 
Indeed, a number of large multinational corporations with a particular interest in 
protecting their IPRs played a major role in the negotiations which led to the TRIPs 
agreement, drafting the majority of the document which became the broadly 
successful position advocated by the office of the US Trade Representative. These 
companies had a significant impact on the conceptualisation of IPRs and the 
(potentially) globalised norms of information commodification lying at the heart of 
the TRIPs agreement. 
The TRIPs agreement is significant in its extension of the rights of the owners of 
intellectual property, representing a major triumph for the US pharmaceutical, 
entertainments and informatics industries. The TRIPs agreement ensures that while in 
the past there was significant variance across the global system as regards the 
protection (and recognition) of IPRs, there is now effectively a single legislative space 
where ownership rights (over knowledge and information) are paramount, and thus 
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these corporations can enjoy the same harmonised protection throughout the global 
economy. Indeed, Kurt Burch contends that this expansion of ownership rights 
also extends an essentially liberal conception of social life as relations 
organised and understood by reference to exclusive property rights... [it] 
promotes the vocabulary of rights and property and the liberal conceptual 
framework they help define.
8
 
Furthermore, Samuel Oddi argues that the use of a natural rights discourse tries to 
establish that 
these rights are so important that individual [WTO] member welfare should 
not stand in the way of their being protected as an entitlement of the 
creators. This invokes a counter-instrumentalist policy that members, 
regardless of their state of industrialisation, should sacrifice their national 
interests in favour of the posited higher order of international trade.
9
 
The rights of capitalists to commodify information and knowledge as they see fit are 
privileged throughout the agreement, and are regarded as the naturally ‘just’ rights of 
ownership. This attempts to raise commercial rights to exploit information and 
knowledge to the same level as human rights. Although this may be legitimate it is 
hardly uncontroversial, given that sometimes the exercise of these commercial rights 




Therefore, while the agreement imposes a complex and wide ranging set of 
requirements on signatories,
11
 at the core is a particular set of norms regarding the 
treatment of knowledge as property. These norms underpin the entire agreement and 
are based on the notion that the private ownership of knowledge as property is a major 
spur to continued economic development and social welfare. They further emphasise 
the development of knowledge as an individualised and proprietorial endeavour, and 
the legitimate reward of such individualised effort. Most obviously TRIPs includes a 
robust norm of commodification of knowledge and information, which in itself should 
alert us to the fact that the ‘information age’ is capitalist business-as-usual, utilising 
previously established legal structures to ensure that capitalists’ ability to commodify 
important and profitable assets and resources continues into the so-called ‘information 
age’. It is not as some ‘Internet Utopians’ have claimed, a world beyond capitalism.
12
 
Before moving to look at the issue of the ‘information age’ it as well to understand the 
interaction of law and market. 
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1. The rule of law and markets 
If modern law is ‘a body of enacted laws; ...positive law, willed, made and given 
validity by the state itself in the exercise of its sovereignty’, then we can assume that 
laws do not develop spontaneously.
13
 Laws recognise non-state activities or traditional 
practices, but can only be law in the sense of a society wide legal code through the 
existence of legitimate political authority. Indeed, formalised law and the interests of 
the state are inseparable: ‘the law is a moral topography, a mapping of the social 
world which normalises its preferred contours - and, equally importantly, suppresses 
or at best marginalises other ways of seeing and being’.
14
 By coding certain outcomes 
and practices as legal and others not, the state affects certain outcomes and legitimises 
coercion against those practices not consistent with such an agenda. The capitalist 
state constitutes much of society qua capitalist society through the legal forms it 
adopts to recognise and legitimise certain activities undertaken by contracting legal 
individuals. Even when the law seems absent, private space still exists within the 
jurisdictional space; the lack of rules in any specific instance is merely part of the 
overall current legal settlement and may change as the needs of capital change. 
Politics is never absent from law’s development: the enacted law is intricately tied up 
with the interests and practices of the capitalist state. 
As E.P. Thompson suggested: ‘The greatest of all legal fictions is that the law itself 
evolves, from case to case, by its own impartial logic, true only to its own integrity, 
unswayed by expedient considerations’.
15
 This is not to suggest that the law merely 
reflects the needs and interests of the ruling class; it is not merely ‘superstructure’, 
rather Thompson argues that the ‘imbrication’ (overlapping) of law and productive 
relations, means that legal institutions and the capitalist market economy are 
interconnected and impossible to completely separate. At the same time that laws 
structure productive relations (most obviously, but by no means exclusively, through 
property rights and legalised commodification), such law also changes in reaction to 
shifts in political economic relations mediated through the state’s governing 
apparatus, although such shifts are never automatic nor instrumental. This imbrication 
of law and productive relations is ‘endorsed by norms’ although such norms are 
always subject to conflict and need to be constantly (re)produced.
16
 The laws of the 
capitalist state and the social relations of capitalist economic activity are not related in 
a uni-directional manner but rather are intertwined in a simultaneous layering, each 
one affecting the other.   
While itself part of the ruling apparatus and part of the way the state legitimises itself, 
law is also the way a society co-ordinates its various demands, interests and actors. 
Therefore, it is impossible to imagine a developed and complex market society 
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 Markets are based on social rules and conventions, but these are backed 
by legal institutions in the last analysis. Laws which contradict social norms are 
difficult to enforce and thus while states may try to shift such norms through laws 
(through welfare and social policy for instance), such moves cannot (at least in a 
democracy) be made too quickly or against serious social resistance. Markets are a 
site of conflict over norms, contestation regarding acceptable practice, and the victory 
of particular interests. Frequently governments argue that they are required by ‘the 
markets’ to adopt certain practices (including regulatory systems). Such reification is 
mistaken: markets are the summation of the decisions (or perceived future decisions) 
of the actors whose economic interactions the market represents; markets do not act 
independently of such decisions, although the outcomes are aggregated. 
The law is therefore a site of contestation and reproduction of the state’s ability to 
rule, and as such mediates between those it governs and the state itself, where those it 
governs are not limited to its own nationals but also include non-nationals operating 
within its jurisdiction. The law not only limits the actions of the ruled but the rulers as 
well: the law ‘may disguise the true realities of power, but at the same time... may 
curb that power and check its intrusions’.
18
 Thompson was keen to emphasise that the 
Rule of Law was an ‘unqualified human good’,
19
 even while stressing the injustice of 
particular laws. Thus, historically, one of the devices for countering resistance to the 
state has been to limit such rule through legal limits on state activity. Property laws 
both establish the state and protect property owners from the power of the state. Only 
by being seen as just can law rule without massive and continuing reinforcement 
through police action. The law and the state are intermingled; state governance 
develops using law to further particular interests within its jurisdiction, but also aware 
of the need to respond to resistance where the rule of law is too far removed from 
community understandings of fairness, justice or customary practice.  
While law is not merely an epiphenomena of social relations, it does reflect (in a 
contested manner) the interests of certain groups more than others. Hence 
considerable political resources are deployed to establish certain ‘common-sense’ 
rights (most importantly for the argument here: the right to hold property in creative 
products, innovations and other forms of knowledge or information). In this sense the 
state in its enactment of law is a site of contestation between competing groups whose 
power resources may be fundamentally unequal. Although the state favours those who 
serve its (economic and political) ends, their more extreme demands may be 
compromised to protect the legitimacy of the overall legal structure. Now that I have 
laid out why law might be central to capitalist societies’ economic organisation, we 
can focus on the key concern of this short essay; the commodification of information 
in the age of the Internet. 
2. The centrality of intellectual property law in the ‘information age’ 
Capitalism revolves around the relations between property holders, with many only 
having their labour (as property) to bring to the market. If capitalists are to make a 
profit and therefore accumulate more capital as they must do if they are to reproduce 
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their capital, they must find things from which they can extract the surplus value, via 
the market. Most importantly these must be combined in various ways and then sold 
for more than their collective cost. This requires a regime of property rights to allow 
for the legally sanctioned transfer of resources (including labour) from one group to 
another. Historically capitalists have managed to render many things as property, and 
the expansion of IPRs represents merely another phase of their need to mobilise raw 
materials (their inputs) as legalised property. 
Despite the claims of Internet Utopians (who remain surprisingly influential in policy 
circles), class differences based on ownership of the means of production have not 
disappeared. In the information economy the ownership of valuable knowledge 
resources remains largely with the various segments of capital, while workers are 
allowed access to these resources only to work them. They may work on, and use, the 
knowledge and information that companies control but they are mostly unable to 
finally own it. Employers use both legal and organisational techniques to ensure even 
senior workers cannot legally retain extensive knowledge resources (or ‘knowledge 
capital’) for their own use. ‘Work-for-hire’ provisions in intellectual property rights 
law (patent and copyright) allow the appropriation of the intellectual outputs of the 
workforce by the contracting employer.
20
 
While the methods of extraction may have changed, the logic remains unaltered. Like 
material property relations, intellectual property relations render output alienable and 
therefore exchangeable in markets, they commodify knowledge and information for 
capital’s ends. The continuing deployment of technology has rendered intellectual 
activity directly productive and has allowed the demystification of many economic 
practices. This is hardly novel. Karl Marx pointed out last century that, 
even down into the eighteenth century the different trades were called 
‘mysteries’ [but] Modern Industry rent the veil that concealed from men 
their own social process of production, and that turned the various 
spontaneously divided branches of production into so many riddles, not 
only to outsiders, but even to the initiated. The principle which [modern 
industry] pursued, of resolving each process into its constituent movements, 
without any regard to their possible execution by the hand of man, created 
the new modern science of technology.
21
 
Therefore, the move to reconstruct work into (commodified) tasks deliverable (at least 
partly) by machines is not part of the novelty of the information age, rather the 
rendering of ‘skilled practices’ as techniques is part of the characteristic logic of 
capitalism. The logic of capitalism has prompted the development of expert systems 
and software to commodify and carry out many information-related jobs, and the 
encourages the organisation of these new tasks into new industrial sectors. 
Furthermore, companies frequently attempt to buy out those inventors who have 
managed to patent an idea, or rely on the increasingly expansive process of filing a 
patent to ensure that inventors find it hard to garner any protection for their 
innovations, allowing its capture by capital. For copyright, similar difficulties for 
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exploitation arise. Few authors can successfully muster the funds to not only produce 
copies of their publication, but also mobilise the resources (from marketing to 
distribution) that will support the widespread availability of their work. It is hardly 
self-evident that the Internet will change this situation: in the music industry, although 
there have been attempts to record and distribute music outside the major global 
recording companies, these companies remain the only route to large scale 
distribution and potential rewards for the artist. Few if any ‘unsigned’ artists have 
been able to break into the global music market via Internet distribution and 
marketing (despite a number of services utilising peer-to-peer technologies). In other 
areas of the ‘creative’ industries, it is the same; to secure significant distribution (and 
therefore income) the originators or creators of knowledge- or information-related 
products need to assign the rights to their work to large companies, who then control 
these rights for exploitation. 
Ownership and control of IPRs in capitalist enterprises is maintained through the 
conjunction of contract and property law. IPRs enable the enclosure of specific ideas 
into ‘properties’ while service and employment contracts ensure the control of these 
properties lies with capitalists, not the creators themselves.
22
 As the celebrants of the 
‘new economy’ continually remind us, the new tools of work are located in the mind, 
but when these tools produce discrete ideas, products of innovations, labour contracts 
with IPR provisions aim to enclose such knowledge as the property of the employer.
 23
 
Intellectual property therefore allows the separation of the individual from the 
products of their own mind, it reproduces the alienation of the worker from the 
product of their labour that was central to Marx’s characterisation of capitalist 
commodification of labour. 
Marx placed the ‘making’ of property, or commodification, at the centre of his 
analysis of capitalism: this is the appearance of relations between individuals as a 
relationship between things. (Of course, one might argue that the making of property 
from information and knowledge is more akin to primitive accumulation than to 
commodification, but I shall leave this aside here.) Capitalism has progressively 
deepened its penetration into previously non-commodified social relations. However, 
we must clearly distinguish markets from capitalism. Markets are a device, embedded 
within society, for the co-ordination of demand and supply which produces prices that 
enable exchange mediated by money of goods that have been socially produced. This 
contrasts with capitalism, which intervenes in the economy by producing goods or 
services specifically for profit, speculatively. The capitalist earns a socially 
recognised (and legitimated) return on investment (enabling capital to be reproduced 
and accumulated) when items are brought to market and successfully sold. Market 
economies can exist without capitalism and have done so, but capitalism cannot exist 
outside a market economy. 
This analytical separation enables changes in the form of market relations (most 
specifically the sorts of commodities and services brought to market) to be 
distinguished from the driving organisational logic of capitalists acting in the market 
itself. If we accept that markets are not the same as capitalism, then while they are 
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inter-related, changes in the market’s character do not indicate necessary changes in 
the ‘laws of motion’ of capitalism. The character of the economy may change due to 
technological or social changes, and this may expand or contract the possibilities for 
capitalistic intervention, but it does not change the reproductive cycles of capital 
itself. The claimed shift from physical products to ‘virtual’ services is a shift within 
capitalism, not the emergence of some new political economic form. 
Technologies can change without any necessary corresponding shift in the way the 
economy is organised: the Internet, in this sense, is merely a new form of (marketised) 
space for capitalist relations to operate within. The ability to interact over the Internet 
is subject to property relations. Time on-line is sold, not free; where it seems ‘free’ 
either through the University, or in public access booths in libraries, it has still been 
commodified. Free access merely means the commodity has been purchased 
elsewhere (in bulk by the university of library service) or supplied as part of a 
subscription package. In the information age, access is property (whatever the claims 
made regarding the free flow of information), much as it has been throughout the 
period when information was delivered through books, over the radio or TV. 
While the technologies and practices of capitalism in the market have changed in 
form, the underlying property relations - those between labour owning and capital 
owning groups - remain in substance unaltered. This represents a remarkable and 
crucial continuity, not evidence for a revolutionary new information age as many 
Internet ideologues suggest. Indeed, it is this continuity of the capitalist logic that 
seems to be wilfully hidden by much of the discourse regarding the emergence of the 
information society, and the ‘new economy’. The nascent information society has 
already seen the expansion of the private rights accorded to information and 
knowledge owners rather than their evaporation, not least through the globalisation of 
IPRs under the TRIPs/WTO legal settlement. Information or knowledge may have an 
existence outside the privately owned realm, but this is increasingly a residual 
category, only recognised when all conceivable private rights have been established. 
3. The capitalist state and the (re)production of information inequality 
The laws of intellectual property are required by information capitalists, but are also 
contested by many social groups. In this area the continuing power and importance of 
the capitalist state stands revealed. Property qua property does not pre-exist the 
apparatus of government (or the state), waiting to be recognised legally; rather the 
legal recognition of property constitutes its existence in a form that can be identified 
as property. Only the law can mandate the rights that ‘owners’ can claim: possession 
is not property in a legal sense, especially as regards information or knowledge. 
The key legal right that extends to the owner of property is the right to ‘control the 
actions of others in respect to the objects of property’.
24
 Most significantly this 
includes: the ability to charge rent for use; to receive compensation for loss; and 
payment for transfer. Thus, the control of other economic actors is maintained by the 
legal ability to exact a price for any specific action regarding such (intellectual) 
property. It is these rights that form the institution of property rather than the specific 
stuff (object or idea) to which a property right is attached. And although the institution 
of property is established enough in modern societies that the sanction of the state to 
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support or enforce this control is seldom needed, behind the acceptance of property by 
those conducting social relations lies the strength of the state. These property rights 
must be robust as the central requirement of capitalism is the ability to contract for 
sale (i.e. transfer of property) and for work (the labour/employer relation). Without 
this possibility, the alienation of goods (for sale) and the alienation of labour (to 
provide capital with work) would be impossible to maintain without recourse to force.  
Whereas physical property has something of a natural scarcity, this scarcity needs to 
be constructed by the state in the case of intellectual property. Without the legal 
construction of intellectual property, the scarcity of knowledge or information that 
produces a price in the market would be difficult if not impossible to establish. And 
without law the ability of the owner of intellectual property to contract for its use 
(either though licensing or sale for use-only) would be equally compromised. That the 
state as final guarantor of intellectual property faces no real competitors is further 
suggested by the private sector’s demands, made concrete through TRIPs, to 
institutionalise sufficient protection for their property. At the centre of TRIPs is a 
radical widening and institutionalisation of state authority, from search and seizure 
based merely on the possibility of infringement, to the introduction of patent laws in 
sectors (such as pharmaceuticals) where for years developing countries have refused 
to implement protection. For information age entrepreneurs, like all profit-driven 
market actors, the protection of property is the sine qua non of successful activities. 
Perhaps most invidiously this protection has gone from being an area of (potential) 
legal debate to a problem of technical specification. Having been frustrated by various 
courts (in both Europe and America) continuing to recognise some notion of fair use 
for information and knowledge, many ‘owners’ have sought recourse in Digital Rights 
Management (DRM) technologies.
25
 Whereas, for much of the recent history of 
copyright there has been a legal space carved out for free public use of information 
and knowledge, encoded ‘fair use’ in law, new DRM technologies have tried to 
circumscribe such use quite severely. In the past certain uses, such as copying extracts 
for educational use, and the utilisation of copyright material for research purposes, 
was frequently legal in certain clearly defined circumstances. DRM halts this use 
without the explicit agreement (and usually payment to) the rights owner. 
Furthermore, both the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in the US and the EC 
Directive on Copyright in Europe explicitly criminalise any attempt to circumnavigate 
such technical controls even if this is to allow legally sanctioned ‘fair use’. These 
technologies are intended to ensure that digital source material cannot be duplicated, 
transferred from machine to machine, or even used in many cases, without the express 
consent of owners. While this is already having some effect on the developed world’s 
software and music markets, the potential impact on the transfer of knowledge to 
lesser developed countries is severe. 
In the past many poor countries have essentially relied on what copyright owners’ 
regard as mass piracy. Utilising cheap copying facilities, textbooks and research 
works have been duplicated and passed around from hand to hand. While on one side 
the digitalisation of source materials, we are told, will ease the flows of information 
around the global system (provided users have the appropriate computer technology, 
of course), DRM also ensures that there will be less uncontrolled usage. The ability to 
reproduce material outside international agreements on copyright will become more 
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difficult, and certainly where information appears in expensive journals (this is 
especially true of scientific knowledge) almost impossible. This has prompted moves 
by George Soros’ Open Society Institute among others to start to encourage and 
support the dissemination of scientific information and research results through ‘open 
source’ journals that are free to end users, which can then be duplicated at will. How 
successful this will be in the face of the concerted efforts of many content owning 
corporations  to assert expanded controls over their ‘assets’ remains to be seen. 
Certainly the support for these open source initiatives from the academic community 
has been both forthright and quite extensive, leading one to hope (at least) that the 
commodification of information delivered over the Internet is not a unidirectional 
dynamic. 
Nevertheless at present the use of DRMs and the protection from circumnavigation 
through law is working to ensure that those countries that need information the most, 
for developmental and welfare purposes and whose population in general does not 
have the wealth to access the Internet will find their access to vital information 
constrained. However, because so many states have signed up to the TRIPs 
agreement, as part of the general accession to the WTO, the possibilities of diplomatic 
resistance remain constrained as the slow and grudging movement on pharmaceutical 
patents after the Doha Ministerial Declaration on TRIPs and Public Health has 
demonstrated. Not only did this statement on the use of generic drugs in heath crises 
take many months to negotiate, producing merely a restatement of the position in 
TRIPs in any case, but the key issue of cross-border supply of generic AIDS-drugs to 
countries with no domestic capacity has only recently been partly resolved. 
4. Resisting information commodification 
The claim that states are no longer effective actors (and hence subjecting them to 
political pressure is a waste of time) has conveniently omitted the state’s role as 
guarantor of the legislative infrastructure that underlies market activity. The declinist 
position represents an ideological acceptance (or reification) of the ‘naturalness’ of 
markets, a denial of states’ extensive legal activities in supporting the free market. If 
this is forgotten then the state might seem to be less involved in social exchanges than 
in the past; the reification of the market has resulted in a denial of the state’s historic 
role in the political economy. By removing the state from accounts of the market, the 
information society can be presented as a challenge to the state. However, the state is 
critically required to legally support the markets of the ‘new economy’, and while its 
means of market intervention may have changed, this is not the same as withdrawal. 
There have certainly been considerable shifts and changes, yet capitalist states remain 
crucial to the (re)production of the economic system. With no state it would be 
difficult for capitalist commodification to continue. 
In the foreseeable future the capitalist state will remain the key actor in the global 
system, and as such must also remain the key target of political action. The political 
denial of efficacy in the face of the globalisation of the information society is an 
ideological mask for the continuation of rule on behalf of capital. However, an 
important distinction is widening between those states able to mobilise the rule of law 
and offer the legal regimes required for information based economic activity and 
those states who have difficulty even maintaining the territorial aspects of statehood. 
Where law has broken down, or alternatively never been established, the resource 
commitment needed to maintain a semblance of order reduces the possibility of the 
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development of any jurisdictional space by the state, let alone a informationalised 
one.
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 While the powerful states continue to ensure their capitalists’ (intellectual) 
property is safe-guarded, others will be increasingly threatened by the information 
age’s commodification of their remaining national resources by international Capital 
(through bio-piracy and the ‘theft’ of traditional knowledge, for instance). Thus, the 
‘information age’ both enhances the power of states that can effectively control their 
jurisdiction, and contributes to the weakness of those that do not. 
The history of IPRs has been a political battle to balance the rights of owners with the 
very important social benefits that flow from social availability of information and 
knowledge. While in the period following TRIPs there has been a clear expansion in 
the rights of owners, this is not a necessary unidirectional dynamic. Commodification 
can be resisted through civil disobedience (of which down-loading MP3 files is 
merely a rather facile example). The circulation of information and knowledge 
through open-source communities is an important move in the direction of 
decommodification which tries to wrest the often proclaimed social(ist) possibilities 
of the Internet from the clutches of the capitalist companies that largely control it. 
Furthermore, given the state’s central role in supporting commodification (and the 
control of informational resources through for instance the support for DRMs), it is 
still worth seeking to organise political pressure to reassert the historical precedents 
within IPR law for ‘fair use’.  
At its most basic such campaigns need to concentrate on limiting the use of DRMs (or 
at least constraining the legal codification and protection of their use-limiting 
capabilities) and re-establishing the information commons as a public domain for the 
nascent global society. Like the environmental movement, the value of the global 
(knowledge) commons must be (re)asserted against the ‘logic’ of continued 
commodification of (informational) resources. To widen access to information, there 
also is a real need to support plain text usage and to resist the constant upgrading of 
software for content generation. Even where those in developing countries have 
secured access to ICTs there is often considerable technological lag. By ensuring that 
information is distributed in easily backwards compatible forms, flows outside the 
high-tech enclaves of the west can be encouraged. However, at its most basic, to resist 
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